India’s Return to Its Central Asian Neighbourhood

02 Sep 2026

Tags: International Relations   Groupings   Regional Agreements

Source: The Hindu

Context: Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to visit Uzbekistan and participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Heads of State meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

• The outreach reflects India’s effort to strengthen engagement with Central Asia, a region of growing strategic importance amid changing Russian, Chinese, Western, Turkish and Iranian influence.

Central Asia: Strategic and Political Context

• Central Asia comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and is landlocked between the major powers Russia and China.
• The post-1991 generation is increasingly shaping domestic politics as these countries seek a new internal equilibrium after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
• Islam is the dominant religion, but generally does not define political identity; Central Asian states maintain a strong stance against radicalisation and terrorism.
• Terrorism, instability from Afghanistan, China’s concerns over radicalisation in its border regions and attacks such as the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow remain major security concerns.
• The region is highly diverse in ethnicity, language, geography and natural resources, influencing the foreign-policy choices of individual states; Turkmenistan, for instance, follows a policy of strict neutrality.
• Intra-regional relations remain complicated by border disputes, competition over water resources and overlapping ethnic identities.
• Türkiye and Iran have traditionally been important influences, while the U.S. and European Union are seeking greater engagement as Russian influence declines and Chinese influence expands.

India’s Historical and Civilisational Linkages

• Central Asia is an important part of India’s wider neighbourhood despite the absence of direct overland connectivity.
• India shares deep civilisational linkages with Central Asia through culture, religion, languages, trade and architecture.
• Geographically, India and Tajikistan are separated by only the narrow Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan, highlighting their proximity within the larger Eurasian landmass.
• India therefore views Central Asia not merely through contemporary geopolitics but as part of its historical and civilisational continuum.

India’s Renewed Central Asian Engagement

• Prime Minister Modi’s 2015 visit to all five Central Asian republics marked a significant shift from India’s earlier tendency to defer to Russia regarding its traditional sphere of influence.
• In 2017, India and Pakistan became full members of the SCO, with India’s membership supported by Russia and Pakistan’s by China.
• In 2022, India invited all five Central Asian leaders as Chief Guests for Republic Day to mark 30 years of their independence and diplomatic ties; the COVID-19 pandemic subsequently shifted the event online.
• The initiative nevertheless resulted in institutional mechanisms such as the India-Central Asia Dialogue, providing a regular platform for cooperation.

Why Central Asia Matters to India

• Central Asian countries are increasingly seeking partners beyond Russia and China for economic and socio-economic development, creating space for greater Indian engagement.
• India’s experience as a plural, moderate and democratic society is viewed positively in the region.
• India needs to prevent geopolitical barriers, particularly those arising from Pakistan’s efforts to limit India’s physical and strategic access to the region, from weakening these historical connections.
• India can expand cooperation with Central Asia in trade, defence, natural resources, technology, education, healthcare, culture and tourism.

Uzbekistan: Key Partner for India

• Choosing Uzbekistan for the Prime Minister’s state visit reflects the steady improvement in bilateral relations since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed office in 2016.
• Uzbekistan is among the region’s more dynamic countries and has actively sought to diversify its external partnerships.
• Historical cities such as Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara provide strong cultural and historical connections between India and Central Asia.
• Uzbekistan has adopted a firm approach towards terrorism and extremism, making security cooperation important for India.
• Its geographical proximity to and deep understanding of Afghanistan, along with its pragmatic approach towards the Taliban, is strategically relevant to Indian interests.
• India and Uzbekistan have discussed alternative rail and road connectivity routes through Iran and Afghanistan, which may need reassessment in light of developments in both countries.

India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

• The SCO evolved from the “Shanghai Five”, established in 1996, and has expanded substantially, comprising 10 members, 15 dialogue partners and 2 observers.
• India has participated regularly in SCO Heads of State meetings, except in 2024, reflecting its sustained engagement with the organisation.
• India’s SCO participation is driven primarily by geography and strategic interests rather than ideological alignment.
• Within the SCO, India faces the challenge of dealing with the combined influence of China and Pakistan, but continued engagement remains strategically necessary.
• India has sought to use the SCO to promote cooperation in economics, technology and civilisational exchanges, rather than allowing it to become exclusively China- or Russia-centric.
• India’s broader SCO vision emphasises security, connectivity and opportunity.

Strategic Significance

• For smaller Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan, which are heavily dependent on China, engagement with India and the SCO can provide additional geopolitical and economic space.
• India’s simultaneous engagement with the Indian Ocean Region and Central Asia reflects its dual maritime and continental strategic interests.
• Strengthening ties with Central Asia can help India pursue diversified connectivity, energy and mineral resources, counter-terrorism cooperation and greater strategic autonomy in the wider Eurasian region