AI as a Great-Power Competition: Strategic Choices for India

24 Sep 2026

Tags: Internal Security   Cyber & Media   Network risks

Source: The Indian Express

Context: Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly becoming a domain of economic, technological and strategic competition, particularly between the United States and China.

  • Recent US–China discussions indicate that AI is moving beyond technology and trade into international security, strategic stability and crisis management.
  • For India, this creates a complex situation: it must cooperate with the United States and other trusted partners while maintaining technological engagement with the wider Global South.

From BRICS Cooperation to US–China Strategic Dialogue

  • At the BRICS summit in Delhi, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasised greater openness, accessibility and diffusion of AI technologies.
  • China proposed an open-source AI community within BRICS and invited BRICS members to participate in the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO), a China-led initiative focused on international AI cooperation.
  • In contrast, the emerging US–China dialogue is focused more strongly on the risks associated with advanced frontier AI models, including accidents, misuse and military applications.
  • Recent discussions have considered a mechanism for notifying each other about AI incidents with national-security implications, potentially functioning as a crisis-management channel.
  • This reflects a broader reality: while AI governance is being discussed multilaterally, frontier AI capabilities and technological infrastructure remain highly concentrated among major powers.

AI and Strategic Stability

  • The emerging US–China engagement has parallels with the Cold War, when the United States and Soviet Union simultaneously competed technologically and negotiated mechanisms to reduce strategic risks.
  • AI could similarly require communication channels that prevent technological accidents or miscalculations from escalating into geopolitical crises.
  • In their November 2024 Lima meeting, US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping affirmed that humans should retain control over decisions concerning the use of nuclear weapons and emphasised responsible development of AI in the military domain.
  • A future incident-notification or emergency communication mechanism could help establish what happened, whether it was accidental or deliberate, and who was responsible before a crisis escalates.

Why a Comprehensive US–China AI Deal Remains Difficult

  • The United States seeks mechanisms to manage risks from powerful AI models and their potential military applications.
  • China is concerned that discussions on AI safety could become a means of preserving American technological advantages or legitimising restrictions on Chinese access to advanced computing.
  • The two countries also differ on:
    • Open-source AI models
    • Data governance
    • State regulation
    • Advanced computing access
    • Export controls on sensitive technologies
  • Consequently, the immediate objective is more likely to be strategic stability and risk reduction rather than a comprehensive global AI governance framework.

India’s First Challenge: Navigating US–China Technological Competition

  • India has deep technological and digital links with the United States and has joined the Pax Silica initiative, which focuses on resilient and trusted supply chains involving semiconductors, critical minerals and AI.
  • At the same time, India remains a BRICS member and therefore cannot ignore the AI agenda being shaped within the grouping.
  • India has not joined China's WAICO framework, reflecting the broader strategic concerns and distrust in India–China relations.
  • India therefore needs to balance strategic technology partnerships with the United States with continued engagement in wider multilateral forums.

India’s Second Challenge: Technology Access for the Global South

  • India has emphasised the need to make AI useful and accessible for developing countries and developing societies.
  • China has significant capabilities in computing infrastructure, hardware, advanced models and technological deployment, allowing it to offer a relatively broad package of AI cooperation to developing countries.
  • India therefore faces the challenge of converting its emphasis on inclusive and development-oriented AI into tangible technological capabilities and partnerships.

India’s Third Challenge: Avoiding an AI Condominium

  • India could be concerned if US–China strategic stability eventually develops into an arrangement in which the two leading AI powers effectively set rules for the rest of the world.
  • An exclusive US–China framework could potentially influence access to advanced chips, computing infrastructure, AI models and other critical technologies.
  • Historical experience with the global nuclear order provides India with grounds to remain cautious about technology regimes dominated by a few major powers.
  • At the same time, continued US–China competition for technological leadership and global markets could create strategic space for emerging technology powers such as India.

India’s Strategic Priorities

  • India’s long-term influence in AI will depend less on declarations of technological sovereignty and more on developing actual technological capabilities.
  • Key areas requiring investment include:
    • Computing power and data infrastructure
    • Semiconductor manufacturing and design
    • Indigenous AI models
    • AI research and development
    • Venture and strategic capital
    • Skilled human resources
  • India's participation in Pax Silica provides an avenue for cooperation on semiconductors, critical minerals, AI and resilient technology supply chains.
  • At the same time, indigenous capabilities are necessary to reduce excessive dependence on any single external technology ecosystem.

Way Forward

  • Deepen cooperation with trusted technology partners while maintaining India's strategic autonomy.
  • Develop domestic capabilities in chips, compute, AI models, research and skilled manpower.
  • Use BRICS, G20, United Nations and other multilateral platforms to advocate inclusive access to AI technologies.
  • Support international mechanisms for AI incident notification, crisis communication and human oversight of critical military decisions.
  • Ensure that emerging AI governance arrangements do not create unjustified barriers to technology access for developing countries.
  • Combine international cooperation with domestic technological capacity-building to give India greater bargaining power in the evolving AI order.

Conclusion: AI is becoming simultaneously a technology, economic, geopolitical and security domain. India’s strategic challenge is to engage multiple technological ecosystems while building sufficient indigenous capabilities to participate in shaping—not merely adapting to—the emerging global AI order.

 

Frontier AI

  • Frontier AI refers to highly capable, cutting-edge AI systems that operate at or near the limits of current technological capabilities.
  • Such systems raise concerns beyond conventional AI applications because of their potential impact on cybersecurity, military systems, critical infrastructure, information ecosystems and strategic decision-making.
  • This is why major powers are increasingly discussing not only AI innovation but also risk management and strategic stability.