Context: The United States has acknowledged deploying “on-orbit space control weapons” to defend against hostile actions, raising concerns over the militarisation of outer space.
- U.S. Air Force Secretary Troy Meink made the admission on September 14, which was subsequently confirmed by Space Force chief General Douglas Schiess.
- The development comes amid growing counter-space capabilities being developed by the U.S., Russia, China, India and others.
Growing Militarisation of Outer Space
- Modern societies increasingly depend on satellites for communications, navigation, energy, financial networks and critical infrastructure.
- Many commercial satellites are dual-use, simultaneously supporting civilian activities and military operations.
- The growing military dependence on commercial space infrastructure is contributing to the emergence of Earth orbit as a potential theatre of conflict.
- Military use of commercial satellites may expose them to attack and potentially weaken the protections they receive under International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
Concerns over ‘Space Control Weapons’
- U.S. military doctrine defines space control as encompassing both offensive and defensive operations, despite the newly disclosed weapon being described as defensive.
- The exact nature, capabilities and operational thresholds of the deployed weapons remain undisclosed.
- The absence of clarity regarding what constitutes a “hostile action” increases the possibility of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
- Poorly specified orbital weapons could create instability because defensive systems themselves may be perceived as offensive capabilities.
Risks from Autonomous and Dual-Use Satellites
- Increasingly manoeuvrable satellites may approach one another without clearly understanding each other's intentions, creating risks of accidental escalation.
- Future satellites equipped with Artificial Intelligence (AI) could autonomously detect threats and initiate defensive actions without immediate human intervention.
- Autonomous decision-making becomes particularly problematic when satellites are dual-use and commercially operated, blurring the distinction between civilian and military assets.
- An unintended strike by an autonomous commercial satellite could create significant difficulties in determining state responsibility, operator liability and accountability.
Existing International Legal Framework
- Outer Space Treaty, 1967
- Article IV prohibits placing nuclear weapons or other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in Earth orbit and prohibits establishing military bases or conducting certain military activities on celestial bodies.
- However, it does not impose a comprehensive ban on conventional weapons in outer space.
- Article III requires states to conduct space activities in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter.
- Liability Convention, 1972
- The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects establishes principles for liability for damage caused by space objects.
- However, applying existing liability rules to autonomous, AI-enabled and commercially operated dual-use satellites could become legally complex.
Why Existing Rules Are Becoming Inadequate
- Existing space-law provisions were developed before today's highly interconnected, autonomous and dual-use satellite ecosystem emerged.
- Conventional weapons capable of disrupting critical satellite networks on a large scale complicate the traditional distinction between WMDs and other weapons.
- Attribution becomes difficult when military and commercial infrastructure, human and autonomous decision-making, and multiple operators are interconnected.
- The declining adherence to a rules-based international order further increases the importance of clearer and more enforceable space-governance mechanisms.
Need for Multilateral Governance
- The UN Open-Ended Working Group on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) provides a platform for states to address emerging risks and develop common norms.
- States should establish clearer definitions of hostile action, defensive action, escalation thresholds and permissible counter-space operations.
- Greater transparency regarding deployed orbital weapons can reduce strategic ambiguity and miscalculation.
- Multilateral arrangements should establish mechanisms for notification, attribution, human oversight and accountability for autonomous and dual-use space systems.
