India’s De-risking Strategy amid US–China Rivalry

21 Sep 2026

Tags: International Relations   Neighborhood   Bilateral border relations

Source: The Hindu

Context: The US Congress has backed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, 2026, empowering the US President to impose tariffs of up to 100% on imports from major purchasers of Russian oil and gas, including India, China, Slovakia, Hungary and Azerbaijan.

  • The measure reflects growing geoeconomic pressure on India over its continued engagement with Russia and highlights the risks arising from excessive dependence on any major power.

Growing US–India Geoeconomic Frictions

  • The Trump administration’s economic pressure on India began earlier, including the withdrawal of Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) benefits in 2019 and subsequent tariff-related measures.
  • Several threatened economic measures against India have remained unresolved, creating uncertainty in bilateral economic relations.
  • While geopolitical disagreements have affected diplomatic ties, the article argues that geoeconomic measures could have a more enduring impact on the relationship.

Limits of “De-Americanisation”

  • Some analysts advocate “de-Americanisation” of Indian foreign policy, and India has increasingly diversified its strategic partnerships.
  • India’s hosting of the BRICS Summit, with the participation of Chinese and Russian leaders, demonstrated its willingness to engage with non-Western powers.
  • However, complete distancing from the US is constrained by substantial trade, investment, technology, business and people-to-people linkages.
  • The US remains an important destination for Indian goods and services exports, while Indian professionals and business communities have deep connections with the US.
  • Therefore, deterioration in state-to-state relations need not automatically weaken broader societal and commercial ties.

Diversification of India’s Defence Dependence

  • India’s defence relationship with the US has grown significantly, but New Delhi retains alternatives through partnerships with France, Japan, the UK, Sweden and other European countries.
  • Atmanirbhar Bharat in defence seeks to reduce dependence on external suppliers through domestic production, technology development and indigenous defence capabilities.
  • Diversification can reduce India's dependence simultaneously on the US, Russia and Israel, rather than replacing one external dependency with another.
  • The article argues that India could gradually move away from any perception of strategic dependence on the US that emerged after the India–US Civil Nuclear Agreement.

The US–China Experience: De-risking over Decoupling

  • The US–China relationship demonstrates the practical limits of complete economic decoupling between major economies.
  • President Donald Trump initially advocated separating the US economy from China, and the idea subsequently gained bipartisan support in Washington.
  • However, US policymakers later recognised the enormous economic costs of complete separation.
  • Former US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen argued that full economic separation would be damaging to both countries and destabilising for the global economy.
  • US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, in a 2023 Brookings Institution speech, explicitly stated that US policy was based on “de-risking and diversifying, not decoupling” from China.

India’s De-risking Strategy

  • India is similarly attempting to reduce excessive dependence across critical sectors rather than completely severing external economic relationships.
  • Major areas requiring diversification include:
    • Defence: multiple suppliers and domestic manufacturing.
    • Energy: diversification of crude oil and gas sources.
    • Trade: expanding markets and supply-chain partnerships.
    • Technology and manpower: reducing excessive dependence on particular countries or ecosystems.
  • The article argues that India increasingly needs to de-risk from both the US and China, unlike the US, which primarily seeks to reduce risks associated with China.

Managing a Rising China and a Relatively Declining US

  • India faces the unusual strategic challenge of simultaneously managing one major power whose relative dominance is declining and another whose power is expanding.
  • The historical transition from British to American predominance differed because the emerging US eventually operated within a broader Western-dominated order.
  • The contemporary international system is more multipolar, with China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Iran, the European Union, Japan and Southeast Asian countries pursuing greater strategic autonomy.
  • The US is expected to retain substantial military, technological and economic influence, but other major powers increasingly seek greater freedom from unilateral dependence.

Why Decoupling Is Difficult

  • Economic interdependence: major economies remain connected through trade, investment, technology and supply chains.
  • Strategic interdependence: countries may cooperate with a geopolitical rival where mutual interests exist.
  • Global supply chains: complete separation can raise costs and disrupt production.
  • Market dependence: large economies cannot easily replace important export and import markets.
  • Technology and capital flows: advanced technologies, investment and skilled manpower remain internationally interconnected.

Key Concept: De-risking vs Decoupling

  • De-risking: reducing vulnerabilities arising from excessive dependence while continuing beneficial economic and strategic engagement.
  • Decoupling: substantially separating two economies by reducing or eliminating trade, investment, technology and supply-chain linkages.
  • Strategic autonomy: maintaining sufficient policy freedom to pursue national interests without becoming excessively dependent on any major power.

Way Forward for India

  • Pursue multi-alignment and strategic autonomy rather than exclusive alignment with any power bloc.
  • Diversify energy imports, export markets, defence procurement and technology partnerships.
  • Accelerate domestic capabilities in semiconductors, defence, critical minerals, energy and strategic technologies.
  • Deepen partnerships with the EU, Japan, France, ASEAN and other middle powers.
  • Preserve economically beneficial engagement with both the US and China while reducing vulnerabilities created by excessive dependence.
  • Build resilient supply chains through friend-shoring, diversification and domestic capacity-building.

Conclusion: India’s emerging approach is better understood as de-risking rather than decoupling. In an increasingly multipolar world, strategic autonomy will depend not on isolation from major powers but on maintaining diversified economic and strategic options.