India’s Opportunity to Course-Correct BRICS

08 Sep 2026

Tags: International Relations   Groupings   Global agreements

Source: The Hindu

Context: The 18th BRICS Summit, to be held in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, provides India an opportunity to restore cohesion within the expanded grouping and revive its original focus on reformed multilateralism and a more equitable global order.

Evolution and Original Purpose of BRICS

• BRICS was initially formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to strengthen the voice of emerging economies in global governance, particularly in international financial and economic institutions.
• India initially viewed BRICS primarily as a platform for reforming existing multilateral institutions and promoting a more equitable multilateral order.
• The 2012 BRICS Summit in India, themed “Global Stability, Security and Prosperity”, reflected an expanding focus beyond economics towards broader geopolitical issues.
• India’s presidency contributed to the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and later promoted initiatives such as incorporating counter-terrorism cooperation into BRICS.

China’s Growing Influence and the Challenge for India

• China increasingly viewed BRICS as a counterweight to Western dominance and as a platform to amplify its global influence.
• With BRICS countries accounting for nearly 20% of global GDP in 2010, China saw the grouping as an important vehicle to project its economic and geopolitical ambitions.
• Mechanisms such as BRICS-Plus and BRICS Outreach enabled China to expand engagement with the Global South and strengthen its position as a potential alternative pole in global politics.
• India consequently faced a dual challenge: pursuing reform of global institutions while preventing BRICS from becoming an instrument of Chinese strategic ambitions.
• India, Brazil and South Africa found that China’s support for multilateral reform was selective; notably, China did not support their demands for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.

Consensus: The Core of BRICS Cohesion

• India increasingly prioritised intra-BRICS consolidation to prevent Chinese dominance and preserve the grouping’s effectiveness.
• The traditional consensus principle has been central to BRICS decision-making, ensuring that major differences do not translate into majority-driven decisions.
• India and Brazil resisted attempts to weaken this principle; however, a non-consensus chair’s statement on COVID-19 in 2020 raised concerns about the erosion of this practice.
• The inability of the expanded membership to agree on documents, including at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in May 2026, highlights the growing challenge.
• Repeated resort to non-consensus documents could make BRICS ineffective, much as SAARC has been paralysed by bilateral disputes.

BRICS Expansion and Internal Divisions

• China pushed for expansion of both the New Development Bank and BRICS, while India and Brazil initially resisted expansion.
• BRICS has now expanded to 11 members with the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Indonesia, along with 10 partner countries.
• The expansion has increased internal complexity, as several new members have bilateral political conflicts that can spill over into BRICS functioning.
• India is concerned that such disputes could replicate the experience of SAARC, where bilateral tensions have frequently obstructed regional cooperation.

Non-West vs Anti-West: The Central Ideological Debate

• India seeks to retain BRICS as a “non-West” grouping, rather than allowing it to become an explicitly anti-Western bloc.
• The distinction is important: a non-West grouping seeks greater autonomy and reform of global governance, whereas an anti-West grouping implies geopolitical alignment against Western powers.
• Growing tensions involving China–US competition, Russia–Ukraine, Iran–US/Israel tensions and US trade policies are increasing pressure on BRICS to adopt a more anti-Western orientation.
• India’s own strained relations with the US, including tariff pressures and concerns over US engagement with Pakistan, further complicate its ability to maintain this position.
• However, several BRICS members also prefer strategic autonomy and engagement with multiple power centres rather than geopolitical alignment with China and Russia.
• Therefore, the emerging consensus could be reform of the existing order without wholesale geopolitical realignment.

The Larger US–China Challenge to Global Governance

• Both the US and China increasingly promote competing global visions, sometimes bypassing internationally negotiated rules and established institutions.
• Competition is extending into emerging strategic domains such as Artificial Intelligence, digital and Internet governance, data ownership, 5G/6G, satellite navigation and electric vehicles.
• China has established parallel initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Digital Silk Road and the proposed World AI Cooperation Organisation, challenging established governance and financing structures.
• These initiatives can potentially create parallel global standards and institutions, reducing the relevance of existing multilateral frameworks.

De-dollarisation: India’s Cautious Approach

• Some BRICS members have promoted de-dollarisation, including proposals for a common BRICS currency.
• India remains cautious about a common currency if it becomes renminbi-dominated, given concerns over excessive Chinese financial influence.
• India and several other members are more comfortable with interlinking payment systems, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and greater use of national currencies for cross-border transactions.
• China is also moving ahead with mBridge, a cross-border payment platform using central bank digital currency technology, which could provide an alternative financial infrastructure.
• India’s concern is that BRICS should not evolve into an alternative Bretton Woods system dominated by China.

India’s Opportunity to Course-Correct BRICS

• The 2026 New Delhi Summit provides India an opportunity to restore the original raison d’être of BRICS—greater representation, institutional reform, stability and a more equitable multilateral order.
• India has sought to address divisions among new members and prevent bilateral conflicts from paralysing the grouping.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi first articulated the idea of “reformed multilateralism” at the 2018 BRICS Summit in South Africa, which subsequently found expression in the 2019 Brasilia Summit declaration.
• India should revive this agenda and position BRICS as a platform for Global South middle powers seeking greater voice in global governance.
• BRICS has significant geopolitical and geo-economic potential despite its imperfect composition and China’s disproportionate influence.
• India and China need greater synergy on emerging global issues, even while managing their bilateral differences.

BRICS and India’s Multi-alignment Strategy

• BRICS can provide India with an important platform to represent the interests of the Global South while simultaneously maintaining relationships with Western powers.
• India’s objective should therefore be multi-alignment rather than bloc politics—engaging different power centres according to national interests.
• A reformed BRICS can strengthen India’s role as a bridge between competing geopolitical groupings and support a more representative global order.
• India needs to proactively shape the grouping because, as BRICS gains importance and more countries seek membership, failure to provide direction could allow other powers to determine its future trajectory.